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The validity of the price marks placed on bonds for valuation purposes is important for a diverse group of stakeholders, including investors, mutual fund managers, dealers, pricing services, and financial regulators. For example, the price marks placed by some banks and hedge funds on certain bond and derivative positions became a controversial topic during the credit crisis that began in 2007 (e.g., see Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011 . One very interested producer and consumer of bond marks is the mutual fund industry. The price marks on individual bonds held by a mutual fund help determine that fund's net asset value (NAV), which governs the terms by which the fund issues or redeems shares. Cici, Gibson, and Merrick [2011] find substantial crossfund dispersion in end-of-month marks placed by US corporate bond mutual fund managers on identical bonds. After controlling for differences related to choice of bid price or mid price marking standards, CGM show that cross-fund bond mark dispersion is higher for lower credit quality bonds, longer maturity bonds, and smaller issues. Mark dispersion also increases during periods when bond market return volatility is high.
In this paper, we investigate the reasons underlying CGM's additional finding that cross-fund bond mark dispersion declined during their 1998 to 2006 sample period.
While a decline in mark dispersion may be consistent with a number of explanations, we examine the impacts of two special institutional developments during this particular period. First, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority's (FINRA) predecessor organization, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), rolled out the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) system for collecting and disseminating corporate bond transaction details in phases starting July 1, 2002. Second, in support of the dramatic growth in trading of credit default swaps (CDS), Markit, the 2 financial information services company, expanded its well-accepted database to provide paying subscribers with end-of-day indicative contract spreads for a wider set of individual issuers. Both of these institutional changes improved market transparency. The NASD's clear goal in introducing TRACE was to increase price transparency in the US corporate debt market as per NASD Chairman and CEO Robert Glauber's statement: "This is far too important a sector to have people operating largely in the dark.
Our aim is to provide quality information to the market about fixed income activity." 1 The NASD's concern may have been directed towards relatively disadvantaged retail investors.
2 Our research, however, does not concern retail investors. We examine whether "operating largely in the dark" applies to professional fund managers as well as the dealers and pricing services supporting them with valuation services.
Our investigation of whether TRACE reduced corporate bond mark dispersion highlights the information channel proposed by Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman [2006] . In their world, increased valuation precision decreases both the inventory risks of market making and the likelihood that dealers can extract rents from less-well-informed counterparties. Their empirical estimates suggest that TRACE's introduction reduced trade execution costs by one-half, and that a spillover liquidity effect results in cost reductions even for non-eligible bonds.
Furthermore, a corporate bond of a given issuer can be valued via a theoretical arbitrage relationship with a CDS referencing this same issuer (Duffie [1999] We test whether initiations of TRACE trade reports and/or Markit database issuer introductions reduced cross-fund bond mark dispersion. Our first TRACE tests examine dispersion levels in tight six-month windows before and after three key TRACE rollout events. We find that bonds show economically and statistically significant decreases in mark dispersion after the dates their trade prices are first disseminated in TRACE. We also find evidence of concurrent decreases in mark dispersion for non-disseminated bonds, consistent with spillover effects via higher quality inputs to "matrix pricing" algorithms. A difference-in-differences regression test design applicable to the two-stage rollout of BBB-rated bonds as in Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri [2007] provides clearer evidence supporting this interpretation. Corresponding CDS tests examine dispersion levels in six-month windows before and after issuers first appeared in the Markit database. We find some evidence that, prior to the July 2002 inception of TRACE, bonds show decreases in mark dispersion when their issuers first appear in the Markit database.
No such pattern exists after July 2002. This evidence suggests that the pricing information generated via TRACE bond transaction reporting encompasses any markrelevant information generated by CDS spreads. Taken altogether, our results provide support for the idea that the TRACE transparency initiative reduced information 4 inequality within the institutional side of the market. Thus, the NASD's concern about people "operating largely in the dark" effectively applied to professional fund managers.
Marking a bond
A mutual fund faces securities pricing challenges every day when it produces its corporate bonds and syndicated loans. They find evidence of a small reduction in the spreads that safer and more transparent firms pay to borrow in both the bond market and from banks after initiations of CDS trading. In contrast, they also find that CDS trading initiations have increased the cost of debt financing for the riskier firms as well as those that are more opaque.
Finally, Bessembinder and Maxwell [2008] suggest that while TRACE transparency reduced the cost of trading corporate bonds, it also reduced the quality and quantity of the services provided by bond dealers. Tempelman [2009] asserts that any TRACE facilitation of price discovery has been at the expense of quantity discovery and has incrementally decreased bond market liquidity. Das, Kalimipalli, and Nayak [2014] suggest that TRACE-induced reductions in dealer market-making activity incentivized large customers to move business to CDS markets. They find that initiation of CDS trading causes deterioration in corporate bond market efficiency without any associated improvements in bond market quality or liquidity.
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Data
We combine data from Morningstar, Mergent FISD, FINRA, and Markit. The
Morningstar mutual fund holdings database contains the market value, par value, and
Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures (CUSIP) identifier of each security held by each mutual fund on each report date. Both surviving and dead funds are available in the database. We obtain historical bond issue-specific characteristics such as credit ratings, coupon rates, maturity dates, and issue sizes from Mergent FISD and match these data via bond CUSIPs with Morningstar holdings data beginning in 1995.
FINRA provided additional data on TRACE dissemination dates.
We follow CGM and calculate a full or "dirty" price for every bond holding as the ratio of market value to par value on each bond held by each fund. 5 We measure bond mark dispersion as the interquartile range (IR), the difference between the 75th and 25th
percentiles in the distribution of these price marks for the set of funds that hold a given bond on a particular month-end date. For a bond to be included in the sample, three or more funds must report the price of the identical bond as of the same date. By law, funds must submit holdings reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission every fiscal quarter. Nevertheless, we construct a monthly mark dispersion data series because fund fiscal year ends are spread throughout the year and because some funds voluntarily report holdings to Morningstar on a monthly basis. As in CGM, we calculate dispersion separately for all bond mutual funds, mid-marking funds, and bid-marking funds.
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We obtain historical data on issuers with CDS contracts from The result is statistically weaker for bid-and mid-marking funds. We also find evidence of decreased dispersion for the other bonds, again consistent with a spillover effect or continued refinement in the use of TRACE information by the pricing services.
Finally, Panel C reports results for an event window centered on October 2004.
The results reveal more muted changes in dispersion, perhaps due to the fact that most of the bond universe had already been disseminated in TRACE for some time. Only the all other BBB bonds show some evidence of a dispersion decrease after October 2004 (the date when their prices began being disseminated). However, these results should be interpreted with caution given the statistically significant coincident decline in volatility.
The coefficient point estimates from the boldfaced rows (i.e., the bond groups being disseminated on the event date under study) tend to indicate that dispersion impacts are largest and most statistically significant. for the all other high yield bonds group do not conform to the expected pattern. Goldstein et al. [2007] emphasize that the two-stage rollout of BBB bonds permits a difference-in-differences research design for testing TRACE dissemination effects across the April 14, 2003 event date. This is the only event in the TRACE rollout that can be analyzed using a difference-in-differences approach. Exhibit 2 presents results from difference-in-differences regressions for these BBB bonds. for the 120 select BBB bonds relative to that for the non-disseminated BBB bonds.
Insert Exhibit 2 about here
The first column in Exhibit 2 reports estimates using all data for the January 1995 lower price dispersion for all of the issuer's bonds. This indirect TRACE effect is statistically significant at standard levels. 8 Second, the negative estimated coefficients on the 120 Select Bonds * Post-April 13, 2003 suggests that dispersion for the 120 select bonds group fell 6.0 to 10.0 cents relative to the non-disseminated BBB bonds via a direct TRACE dissemination impact. This direct dissemination effect is statistically significant at the 5% level for a one-sided test in the first sample, but lacks significance in the second sample. In the main, our findings are consistent with the view that the transparency-enhancing TRACE system contributed to a decrease in mark dispersion, including spillover effects on non-disseminated bonds.
CDS trading and mark dispersion
Exhibit 3 
Insert Exhibit 3 about here
Exhibit 4 reports summary statistics comparing characteristics of issuers based upon their Markit database status. Each month, we categorize issuers based upon whether or not they were included in the Markit indicative CDS spread database at that time.
Characteristics were averaged across all issuers belonging to each category every month 15 to create a time series for characteristics of both groups. CDS trading is associated with entities issuing larger bonds, higher credit quality bonds, and longer maturity bonds.
Insert Exhibit 4 about here
Exhibit 5 presents tests investigating whether the expansion of CDS trading was associated with shifts in bond mark dispersion for three issuer groups based upon credit rating (all issuers, only investment grade issuers, and only high yield issuers) for each of our three fund marking categories (all funds, only bid-marking funds, and only midmarking funds). Panel A compares bond mark dispersion in six-month windows before and after the date that Markit first releases an issuer's CDS contract spread data.
Regardless of the sample studied, we find no statistically significant changes in mark dispersion for bonds in the period surrounding the issuer's first appearance in Markit.
Note that, using Hasbrouck's [1993] pricing accuracy measure, Das et al. [2014] find no significant improvement in market quality after initiations of CDS trading.
Insert Exhibit 5 about here
The results from Panel A incorporate Markit database issuer introductions occurring both before and after the July 1, 2002 start of the TRACE system rollout. It may be possible that indicative CDS spreads do provide useful information for marking bonds, but that such information adds little value to the direct trade report data available from TRACE. Panel B examines just those issuer introductions occurring in the pre-TRACE period. For the all funds sample, mark dispersion for the all issuers group falls by 5.0 cents on average (significant at the 5% level) when an issuer first appears in Markit. Corresponding results for bid-and mid-marking funds show decreases in dispersion of similar size that lack statistical significance at conventional levels.
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The pre-TRACE period results for investment grade issuers amplify those found using data for all issuers. 
Conclusions
Our evidence suggests that the transparency-enhancing TRACE system was associated with large and statistically significant decreases in cross-fund bond mark dispersion. We find some evidence that issuer initiations into Markit's CDS spread database also contributed to a decrease in bond mark dispersion, but only during the pre-TRACE era. These results support the view that the NASD's original stated concern about people "operating largely in the dark" applied to not just retail investors, but also to professional fund managers. Although we offer no fund-level evidence, our results imply that TRACE has led to more uniform mutual fund NAV calculations.
The TRACE-associated decline in bond valuation dispersion provides indirect empirical support for Bessembinder et al.'s [2006] channel relating increased transparency and pricing. Nevertheless, Das et al. [2014] suggest that TRACE-enhanced 17 transparency may have reduced market-making activity, moved business to CDS markets, and caused corporate bond market efficiency to deteriorate. Das et al. [2014] also find no evidence that CDS trading improves market quality as measured by price accuracy. For the bond marks used by mutual fund managers, we find that the information generated by the CDS market appears redundant given TRACE bond trade report transparency.
Exhibit 1 Dispersion comparison before and after TRACE dissemination dates
This table reports the interquartile range of the bond prices reported by mutual funds for alternative bond groups for pre-and post-TRACE event data windows. The first data window includes all observations in the six months prior to the event date or event period. The second window includes all observation in the six months subsequent to the event date or event period. We could not separate the set of 50 initially disseminated high yield bonds since none of these bonds were held by at least three funds in both the pre-and post-event windows. Thus, the "50 select high yield bonds" group does not appear in the table. Dispersion is calculated separately for all bond mutual funds, mid-marking funds, and bid-marking funds. We aggregate any multiple observations for the same bond in each of the windows by averaging their corresponding dispersion measures. Volatility is the annualized monthly standard deviation of daily percentage returns for the Barclays US Corporate Investment Grade Bond Index. N refers to the number of bonds in each sample. Statistics for the differences in dispersion between the two windows (presented in parentheses) are based on a paired t-test interpreted using one-sided test statistic critical values of 2.32 (1% significance level), 1.65 (5%), and 1.28 (10%). Within each panel, groups in boldfaced type are being disseminated on the event date under study. Groups in italicized boldfaced type have not yet been disseminated but share the credit rating and size category of other bonds being disseminated for the first time on the event date under study.
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Exhibit 1 -continued
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Exhibit 2 Pooled regressions of price dispersion based upon the BBB-bond "natural experiment"
This table reports results from pooled regressions of price dispersion for a set of BBB bonds on several control variables and certain dummy variables created to capture the impact of TRACE as motivated by Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) . Dispersion is measured as the interquartile range of prices reported by all mutual funds that reported ownership of a particular bond at a particular date. Only bond-date observations where the bond is held by at least three mutual funds are included. Observations include all BBB bonds with issue size less than $1 billion and greater than $10 million identified during a screening period from July 8, 2002 to January 31, 2003 as in Goldstein et al. (2007) 
Exhibit 4 Comparison of issuer and bond characteristics stratified by CDS contract activity
Issuers were categorized every month into two groups based on whether they had had an active CDS contract to that point. Characteristics were averaged across all issuers belonging to each category every month, creating a time-series of monthly characteristics for each of the groups. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the characteristics' difference tests. Exhibit 5 Cross-fund bond mark dispersion before and after introduction of issuer into Markit's CDS contract spread database Dispersion is reported for all issuers as well as subsamples split into investment grade and high yield categories. Tests compare the interquartile range of bond price marks reported by mutual funds before and after CDS contract spread information for the issuer first becomes available via the Markit database. This price dispersion measure is calculated separately for all bond mutual funds, bid-marking funds, and mid-marking funds for both a pre-CDS window that includes all monthly observations within the six-month period prior to the event date and a post-CDS window that includes all monthly observations within the six months period subsequent to the event date. Panel A and B present corresponding results for a full sample and a "Pre-TRACE Era" sample. The Pre-TRACE sample includes all issuers for which the CDS introduction dates occurred before the July 1, 2002 start of TRACE trade dissemination. We aggregate any multiple observations for the same issuer by averaging their corresponding dispersion measures. N refers to the number of issuers in each sample. Statistics for the differences in dispersion between the two data windows appear in parentheses and are based on a paired t-test. (-1.09) 
